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Abstract
Mundell [5] has demonstrated that monetary policy should be paired with external balance and fiscal policy
with internal balance. This seminal article led to a voluminous literature 1 which at tempted to rectify many of
the problems inherent in Mundell's flow equilibrium model. Harry John son [2] has characterized this
extension of Mun dell's work as having "... lent itself to almost infinite mathematical product differentiation,
with little significant improvement in quality of eco nomic product ..." Although we do not fully agree with
Harry Johnson-for there are many deficien cies in Mundell's model-we do believe that more can be said
concerning the "Assignment Problem" in the context of Mundell's model. Specifically, we examine the effects
of introducing discrete lags into the Mundell model. Part A of this note presents a generalized discrete time
version of Mundell's model and shows that the "Principle of Effective Market Classification" cannot guarantee
stability. Part B then examines how the presence of an out side lag affects the results of Part A.
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 LAGS AND THE ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM: A NOTE
 by Harvey Lapan and Walter Enders*
 Mundell [5] has demonstrated that monetary
 policy should be paired with external balance and
 fiscal policy with internal balance. This seminal
 article led to a voluminous literature1 which at
 tempted to rectify many of the problems inherent
 in Mundell's flow equilibrium model. Harry John
 son [2] has characterized this extension of Mun
 dell's work as having "... lent itself to almost
 infinite mathematical product differentiation, with
 little significant improvement in quality of eco
 nomic product..." Although we do not fully agree
 with Harry Johnson?for there are many deficien
 cies in Mundell's model?we do believe that more
 can be said concerning the "Assignment Problem"
 in the context of Mundell's model. Specifically, we
 examine the effects of introducing discrete lags
 into the Mundell model. Part A of this note presents
 a generalized discrete time version of Mundell's
 model and shows that the "Principle of Effective
 Market Classification" cannot guarantee stability.
 Part B then examines how the presence of an out
 side lag affects the results of Part A.
 A) The Basic Model2
 The linearized version of the Mundell model can
 be represented by:3
 YT = olSt + ?rT (1)
 BT = CYT + XrT (2) or
 Br = a?ST + (A + Cj8)rr (2')
 where: Y= income
 r = interest rate
 S = government surplus
 B = balance of payments
 and a < 0; ? < 0; C < 0; X > 0.
 The problem posed is how to use monetary policy
 (represented by the interest rate) and fiscal policy
 (represented by the government surplus) to guar
 antee the attainment of full employment and bal
 ance of payments equilibrium. If policy makers
 knew the underlying structure of the economy they
 could directly set the values of the instruments at
 the levels which would produce the desired values
 of the targets. However, the underlying structure
 is assumed to be unknown so that policy makers
 must use a groping process to arrive at the desired
 values of the targets. In particular, two policy
 choices are available :4
 (1) the government surplus can be altered in re
 sponse to desired changes in income and the interest
 rate can be altered in response to desired changes
 in the balance of payments; or
 2) the government surplus can be altered in re
 sponse to desired changes in the balance of pay
 ments and the interest rate can be altered in
 response to desired changes in income.
 Thus:5
 Policy I AST = ax[YT- Y*]
 ArT = a2 [B* - Bj]
 or Policy II ArT = bx [YT - Y*~]
 AST = b2[B* - BT]
 where : at and bt are positive adjustment parameters
 Y* = desired level of income
 B* = desired balance of payments
 position
 Mundell's graphical analysis implies specific val
 ues for the adjustment coefficients: i.e.,
 fli = --; a2 = ; b1=?-; b2=?, a a -f C? ? ot?
 With these specific values, Mundell finds that
 Policy I guarantees stability while Policy II renders
 the system unstable.
 This particular choice of the adjustment param
 eters assures that if only one instrument is changed
 then the desired magnitude of its corresponding
 target is achieved. These adjustment coefficients,
 then, imply that both the monetary and fiscal
 authorities know the underlying structure of the
 * The authors are respectively Associate and Assistant Professors of Economics, Iowa State University. We would like to thank
 Bernie Rothman for his assistance in the preparation of this note and we bear the full responsibility for any remaining errors.
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 economy and that the informational problem is
 one of policy coordination between the different
 branches of government. Since policy makers are
 faced with situations in which they know neither
 the behavior of other branches of government nor
 the underlying structure of the economic system,
 it is of interest to determine whether Policy I
 guarantees stability and Policy II instability, re
 gardless of the choice of adjustment coefficients.
 If Policy I is adopted, the characteristic equation
 of the system takes the form:
 E2 - d0E + dx = 0
 where: d0 = 2 ? a2(X + (/?) + axa
 dx = 1 + axOL ? a2(k + ?/?) ? a1a2oik
 The necessary and sufficient conditions for stability
 are:6
 1 ? d0 + dx = ?axa2(xX > 0 (3)
 1 + d0 + dx = 4 4- 2a1(x - 2a2(X + C?) - a^a&X > 0
 (4)
 1 ? dx = a^^? + a2(X + C?) ? ?iOt > 0 (5)
 Equation 3 is always satisfied as long as a1 and a2
 are greater than zero; Equations 4 and 5 are satis
 fied by the shaded areas in Figures 1 and 2 re
 spectively. Moreover, Equation 4 can be seen to be
 the only tight constraint since it never intersects
 Equation 5.7
 It should be noted that Mundell's choice of the
 adjustment coefficients (point M in Figures 1 and
 2) always produces stability. However, Policy I does
 not always guarantee that the system will converge
 FIGURE 1.
 FIGURE 2.
 when the possibility of overshooting is recognized.
 Thus, the "Principle of Effective Market Classifi
 cation" does not always hold. Further, since in
 creases in X, C?, and ?a cause the intercepts in
 Figure 1 to fall twice as fast as the Mundell point,
 it can be concluded that the problems associated
 with overshooting increase as the targets become
 more sensitive to the instruments. Thus, acquisition
 of information concerning the underlying structure
 of the system becomes more important as targets
 become more sensitive to instruments.
 Given the set of adjustment coefficients which
 insure stability, it is interesting to note that the
 Mundell point yields the fastest speed of adjust
 ment.8 On minimizing the absolute value of the
 largest characteristic root, we find a1 = ? 1/a;
 a2 = l/(X + C?) and the characteristic roots are
 ?(Cj8/(A + i?))1'2. Notice that the speed of adjust
 ment is independent of a, decreases as ?/? increases
 and increases as X increases.9
 With regard to Policy II, the system is unstable
 with any positive choice of adjustment coefficients.
 Under Policy II, the characteristic equation be
 comes: E2 _ diE + ?3
 where d2 = 2 + b2? ? ottsb1
 ?3=1+ b^b2a.X + b2? ? oiCbi
 The necessary and sufficient conditions for stability
 are violated since the sum of the coefficients is
 negative, i.e., 1 ? d2 + d3 = bxb2aX < 0.
 68
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 B) Outside Lags
 The above treatment of the assignment problem
 assumes that instruments affect targets instanta
 neously. In order to see how lags may alter the
 stability properties of the system, we consider a
 simple lag structure in which the interest rate effect
 on income is lagged one period. This lag structure
 seems reasonable for illustrative purposes since,
 a priori, one can expect that the interest rate effect
 on income takes longer to operate than any other
 outside lag. Using this lag, we can represent the
 model as follows:10
 YT = ocST + ?rT-1 (6)
 BT = ?YT + krT (1)
 AST = a1[YT- Y*] (8)
 Arr = a2[?* - flr] (9)
 Under this policy, the characteristic equation
 takes the form :
 E3 + d4E2 + d5E + d6
 where d4 = ? [2 + a^ ? a2X]
 d5 = (1 - a2X) (1 + flxa) + a2C?
 d6 = -a2C?
 The necessary and sufficient conditions for sta
 bility are:11
 1 + d4 + d5 + d6 = -a^a&A > 0 (10)
 3 - d4 - d5 + 3d6 = 4 4- a^ai? - 4a2C? > 0 (11)
 1 - d4 + d5 - d6 = 4 + 2aiot - 2a2(X - C?)
 ? ala2oik > 0 (12)
 l-d?+d4d6-d5= -a22C?? + C?)
 + a2(l + C?)(l + a1<*)-a1aL>0 (13)
 Condition 10 holds for all al9a2 greater than zero,
 while condition 11 can be shown to be redundant
 given conditions 12 and 13.12 Thus, 12 and 13
 alone define the region of stability, and the shaded
 areas of Figures 3 and 4 depict this region, for the
 cases in which X < ?/? and k > ?/?, respectively.13
 As in the unlagged case, the possibility of over
 shooting can produce instability. In comparing the
 effect of the lag on the region of stability it is ap
 parent that Equation 2 is tight vis-a-vis Equation
 12 since subtraction of 2 from 12 yields 4a2C?9
 which is always positive. Moreover, from Figures
 1, 3, and 4 it is apparent that the lagged case will be
 stable for some values of (al9a2) for which the
 J_
 **t?
 =L -A
 a a
 FIGURE 3. (k < C?)
 -2(x-a?)
 il l2
 a a
 FIGURE 4. (X > C?)
 unlagged case is unstable (e.g., ax> ? 2/a). If
 Equation 2 never intersects Equation 13 in the
 positive quadrant, then the lag unambiguously in
 creases the range of stability. Solving these equa
 tions simultaneously, it can be shown that if X >
 2[N/?3 - 3]?jff~ 1.2Cj8, then the lag unambi
 guously increases the region of stability. Thus, the
 lag tends to be stabilizing as capital becomes more
 mobile since a greater degree of capital mobility
 will reflect itself in increasing X relative to ?/?.14
 Note that the effect of the lag of rT on income
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 increases the range of ax for which the system
 converges; thus, if there is uncertainty about the
 values of X, ?/?, and a, but it is believed that mone
 tary policy affects income with a lag, then relatively
 greater weight should be attached to the speed of
 adjustment of the government surplus.
 In summary, we have seen that the introduction
 of lags into the Mundell model does not alter the
 policy prescription of assigning r to the balance
 of payments and S to Y. However, the presence
 of outside lags can narrow the range of stability,
 and means that some care must be exercised in
 choosing the speed of adjustment of the respective
 targets?too high a speed of adjustment can render
 the system unstable, whereas slow speeds of adjust
 ment retard the convergence of the system.
 Notes
 1. For example see: Levin [3], Mathieson [4], Tsiang [6].
 2. Interested readers are invited to write to the authors for a
 graphical presentation of the results in this section.
 3. Mundell assumes that the exchange rate is fixed so that it
 can be subsumed in the functional forms of Equations 1
 and 2. Thus, it is assumed that the exchange rate is not a
 policy tool although relaxing this assumption would not
 rule out the possibility of overshooting discussed below.
 4. It is not necessary to consider intermediate cases wherein
 each target is adjusted in response to two instruments since
 intermediate cases can be considered to be simultaneous
 usage of both Policy I and Policy II with a weight attached
 to each. If any pure policy proves inferior to the other,
 the weight attached to that policy should be zero.
 5. This policy assignment slightly differs from Mundelfs in
 that here we assume the monetary and fiscal authorities
 operate simultaneously whereas Mundell assumes that the
 policy makers alternate.
 6. See Gondolfo [1, p. 107] for the derivation of these condi
 tions.
 7. Set Equations 4 and 5 equal to zero and solve for a2, i.e.,
 4A ? y-16/lC?
 a2=~2k(l + C?)
 Thus, the solution for the common intersection of 4 and 5
 is imaginary.
 8. Min. d0 + (d0 - 4dx)1/2
 S.T. d0 > 0
 ax > 0
 a2 >0
 Max. d0 ~(d0 -4^)1/2
 S.T. d0<0
 a? >0
 a2 > O
 In each case the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are satisfied at a
 unique point with d0 = 0 and -cial = a2(X 4- i?) = 1.
 9. See Gondolfo [1, p. 16] for an explanation of characteristic
 roots and the relationship between the value of the roots
 and convergence. We note here, that the greater is the largest
 characteristic root (in absolute value) the slower is the
 speed of adjustment.
 10. We only consider Policy I in the lagged case since Policy
 11 is unstable even in the presence of lags.
 11. See Gondolfo [1, p. 107] for derivation of these stability
 conditions.
 12. Assuming Equation 11 holds with equality, we have for
 12 and 13:
 - a\X{X + i?) + 4a2(X + i?) - 4 > 0 (12')
 - [ - alHX + i?) + 4a2(A + i?) - 4] [1 - a2i?] > 0. (13')
 Since, when 11 holds with equality, 1 ? a2i? >0, it follows
 that (12') and (13') must be of opposite sign. Further, note
 that when Equations (11) and (12) intersect, (13) passes
 through the same point. Graphing (11), using this informa
 tion, it is readily seen that whenever Equation (11) is
 violated, either (12) or (13) must also be violated.
 13. The vertical, intercepts of XII and XIII in Figure 4 are
 not important, since both lie above the region of stability
 for the unlagged case. If X < 3i?, XII and XIII do not
 intersect for aY < ? 2/a; if X > 3(/?, then for small values
 of au XII becomes the tight constraint.
 14. X will increase as the degree of capital mobility increases
 since any given change in the interest rate will produce
 greater improvements in the balance of payments. Since S
 reflects the marginal propensity to impact and ? reflects
 the impact of monetary policy on income levels, this product
 reflects the potency of monetary policy on the balance
 of trade.
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